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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD PAULSEN, WILLARD K. 
PAULSEN, NORMAN G. PAUL-
SEX, doing business under the firm 
name and stYle of PAULSEN 
BROTHERS . CONSTRUCTION 
CO~IPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Case No. 7880 
-vs.-
KEXXETH E. COOMBS and LA-
VERNE H. COOMBS, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are not in accord with the statement 
of facts set forth in appellants' brief. The Statement of 
Facts there appearing assumes the most important and 
centroverted issue between the parties to be a proved 
fact; namely, that the signed agreement, Exhibit A in 
this action, expressed the true agreement of the parties. 
With this we do not agree. We, therefore, submit our 
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own statement of what we believe to be the proved facts 
at the trial. 
Arnold Paulsen Willard K. Paulsen and Norman 
' G. Paulsen, doing business as Paulsen Brothers Con-
struction Company, a partnership, were licensed general 
contractors in the State of Utah at all times pertinent 
to this action. R. 37. Kenneth E. Coombs was engaged in 
the real estate business at all times of interest herein. 
R. 130. In September of 1950, in response to a telephone 
call from Kenneth E. Coombs, Arnold Paulsen, one of the 
respondents, went to the office of Mr. Coombs, located 
on Highland Drive in the City of Salt Lake. 1\fr. and 
Mrs. Coombs, appellants herein, met the respondent, 
Arnold Paulsen, there and gave him a set of plans for 
the construction of a house and asked him to figure the 
carpenter labor in the construction of the said house. R. 
38. l\1:r. Paulsen was asked only to submit a bid on the 
carpenter labor. R. 39. He did submit a bid comprising 
his estimate of the cost of the carpenter labor. R. 39. 
The bid as submitted was in the amount of $5,500.00. R. 
41. Mr. Paulsen wrote up on a slip of paper what was 
included in the bid and left the slip of paper at the office 
of Roy Johnson, the architect for Mr. and Mrs. Coombs. 
R. 41. At no time was Mr. Paulsen asked by Mr. Coombs 
to. bid upon or to furnish any materials for the job. R. 
42; the bid submitted was for carpenter labor only, and 
did· not include the swimming pool. R. 39, 60. Coombs 
accepted the bid made by Paulsen and instructed him to 
commence work on the construction of the house, which 
Paulsen did on or about the 15th of October, 1950. R. 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-Hi. K_enneth E. Coombs aeted as his own general con-
tractor. R. 40, 7:2. Smnetin1e after the work had been com-
Inenced :Jlr. Paulsen received a call from 1\fr. Coombs and 
went to the office of l\[r. Coombs, where a typewritten 
contract wat' presented to him by Mr. Coombs, which 
Paulsen identified from the witness chair as Exhibit 
.. A" in tllis action, and Paulsen was asked to sign the 
same. ..:-\.t no time did ~~ r. Coombs indicate to Paulsen 
that there had been any change made in the written con-
tract frmn the bid which l\Ir. Paulsen had submitted. R. 
-1:2. The agree1nent was type\vritten by a stenographer 
in the office of :Jir. Johnson, the architect for 1\fr. 
Coombs. R. 65. l\Ir. Paulsen signed the agreement with-
out reading the same, assuming that it was simply the 
typewritten version of the bid he had submitted. R. 55. 
Paulsen Brothers cmnpleted the job upon which their 
bid was submitted, except for the installation of an item 
of finish hardware, and Mr. Coomb's architect so testi-
fied. R. 6R The item of finish hardware not installed 
was a special catch for the cupboard doors in the library 
and this item of hardware was never made available for 
installation though Paulsen went back several times to 
install the same. R. 43 & 61. Though the job was com-
pleted, the final payment was never made to Paulsen 
by Coombs in the amount of $1,375.00. Though the de-
fendants and appellants admit the extra work claimed by 
plaintiffs and respondents, the amount admitted to be 
due to Paulsen for the extra work, $185.00, has never 
been paid. R. 48. When Paulsen demanded the final pay-
ment called for under the contract, for the first time 
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Coombs began to hedge and claimed that Paulsen was 
supposed to have built a swimming pool and that Paul-
sen should give Coombs credit for the amount it would 
cost to do the carpenter labor on the swimming pool. 
R. 65. After having examined all the pleadings, having 
heard the testimony of the witnesses and examined the 
evidence introduced by the parties, the lower court found 
for the plaintiffs and awarded judgment in accordance 
with the prayer of plaintiff's complaint. The defendants 
appealed the judgment to this court. 
Appellants in their brief dwell at great length on the 
evidence introduced with respect to certain offsets clai.rn-
ed by the appellants against the respondents. In our 
view of this case, this evidence is immaterial to the 
basic issues involved and serves only to becloud the true 
issues between the parties. An examination of the record 
by the court will reveal many discrepancies between the 
record and the interpretation of the record set forth 
in appellants' brief under the Statement of Facts. The 
same is true of the appellants' analysis of the pleadings 
of the parties as set forth in the Statement of Facts. 
We view these voluntary observations of appellants as 
not only unnecessary to a consideration of this case, but 
as being inserted solely to confuse the court. The proved 
facts relative to this case are as we have stated them. 
The pleadings of the parties speak for themselves and 
are before this court for review and we therefore under-
take no staten1ent of these pleadings as facts, but shall 
reserve our comment thereon to the argument. 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE~[ENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
The respondents do not find the orderly presenta-
tion of the position of respondents lends itself to the 
discussion of the matters at issue in this appeal under the 
same points as those relied upon by the appellants. The 
court will find answered herein all of the contentions 
of the appellants, but for the sake of a logical presenta-
tion we present our argument under our own selection 
of points relied upon. 
POINT I. 
AN APPELLATE COURT WILL CONSIDER ONLY 
QUESTIONS RAISED AND RESERVED IN THE LOWER 
COURT. NO QUESTION WAS RAISED BY APPELLANTS 
IN THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRE-
TRIAL PROCEDURE OF THE LOWER COURT OR THE AL-
LOWANCE BY THE LOWER COURT OF THE FILING OF 
ADDITIONAL PLEADINGS FOLLOWING PRE-TRIAL CON-
FERENCE. 
POINT II. 
A WRITTEN CONTRACT MAY BE REFORMED BY THE 
COURT TO EXPRESS THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE 
PARTIES WHEN THE CONTRACT AS WRITTEN CON-
TAINS A MISTAKE IN EXPRESSION WHICH IS MUTUAL 
TO THE PARTIES. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED THE 
CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS AS AN EXHIBIT. 
POINT IV. 
A PARTY TO A CONTRACT CANNOT AT ONE AND 
THE SAME TIME CLAIM THE PROTECTION OF THE CON-
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TRACT AND THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE SAME IN-
SOFAR AS IT BENEFITS HIM AND CHOOSES TO IGNORE 
THE CONTRACT INSOFAR AS IT LIMITS HIM, OR BINDS 
HIM. 
POINT V. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AN APPELLATE COURT WILL CONSIDER ONLY 
QUESTIONS RAISED AND RESERVED IN THE LOWER 
COURT. NO QUESTION WAS RAISED BY APPELLANTS 
IN THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRE-
TRIAL PROCEDURE OF THE LOWER COURT OR THE AL-
LOWANCE BY THE LOWER COURT OF THE FILING OF 
ADDITIONAL PLEADINGS FOLLOWING PRE-TRIAL CON-
FERENCE. 
Under their Point III, the appellants discuss at great 
length what they conceive to be an error on the part of 
the trial court in not confining the issues on the trial to 
the issues outlined in the "pre-trial agreement." That 
the appellants should attempt to exploit the action of the 
court which they themselves compelled and solicited in 
behalf of their client, as ·an error, is indeed ironical. 
A discussion of this matter calls for an analysis of 
the pleadings filed .prior to the pre-trial conference, a 
statement of what took place at the pre-trial conference, 
and an analysis of what transpired on the day of trial. 
Fortunately the pleadings are before this court for re-
view. It is regrettable that the pre-trial conference is not 
a matter of record so that the negotiations there con-
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ducted could be· impartially presented to this court for 
review. As it is, we are dependent upon the frailties of 
hmnan Ineinory for an account of what took place, which, 
coupled with the natural inclination of advocates of a 
client's cause to assume the construction on all state-
ments and actions most favorable to their respective 
clients, n1akes a completely unbiased and impartial state-
Inent of the matter difficult. 
Let us first consider the pleadings of the parties. 
The cmnplaint filed by plaintiffs and respondents R. 1-5 
stated a claim based upon the written contract, Exhibit 
"A," and a clai.In for "Extras." The theory of t~e com-
plaint, as is clearly reflected by a reading of the same, 
shows that the entire reliance of the plaintiff's was up-
on the plaintiff's having furnished carpenter labor under 
the contract referred to in the complaint. No claim was 
made by plaintiffs for any materials furnished. There 
is no reference either in the relief prayed for in the com· 
plaint or in the statement of the cause of action which 
in any way indicates any attempt on the part of the 
plaintiffs to recover for materials. 
The theory of plaintiffs' case has been consistent 
·from the beginning completely through the entire trial. 
Plaintiffs contracted to furnish carpenter labor a11d 
nothing more. They sought to collect for the carpenter 
labor performed and nothing more. In the answer filed 
by defendants and appellants herein, the execution of 
the contract referred to in plaintiffs' complaint was ad-
mitted. No affirmative defenses of any character were 
set forth therein and the only language which perhaps 
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should have served notice upon the plaintiffs that de-
fendants' theory of the contract or construction of· the 
contract was not the same as plaintiffs' was paragraph 
6, wherein defendants denied the complete performance 
of the "work" to be done by plaintiffs and denied that 
plaintiffs performed all the "things" to be performed 
by them. R 20. This rather vague language did not 
awaken plaintiffs to the fact that the defendants were 
claiming that the plaintiffs should have furnished not 
only all of the materials used in the carpenter labor 
under paragraph 6 of Exhibit "A," but steel kitchen cab-
inets, birch planters, and the like (R. 6), nor did it give 
any indication whatever of the fact that defendants were 
claiming that the contract in question covered the con-
struction of a swimming pool. The Court's attention 
is drawn to the fact that the defendants made no asser-
tion of a counterclaim, did not assert any damages of any 
kind and made no affirmative demand for setoffs. Under 
this status of the pleadings, the pre~-trial conference was 
held on March 25th, some five weeks following the filing 
of the answer. 
At the pre-trial conference defendants, through their 
counsel, again asserted substantially the same defense 
as claimed in the answer, there being no specification 
by the defendants as to what it was they claimed plain-
tiffs had not done. It was stated by defendants' counsel 
that one of the claims which they made was that Paulsen 
should have furnished under the contract certain mate-
rials for the work done under paragraph 6 of the con-
tract, but it was indicated that this was a minor matter; 
8 
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Plaintiffs pointed out to the court that it was plaintiffs' 
position that they were not required by the agreement 
to furnish the materials and that the parties had not 
so contemplated at the ti1ne of the making of the agree-
ment or at any time since until the controve,rsy in which 
they now found themselves. Plaintiffs' counsel stated 
that since the wording in the written agreement did seem 
to include materials, that if counsel for the defendants 
would state what materials they claimed should have 
been furnished which were not, and what work had not 
been done by plaintiffs that should have been done, 
this might be a relatively easy way to determine the 
real difference in terms of money between the parties, 
and perhaps there would be no issues to be tried and 
a settlement could be effected. It was pointed out to 
the court and to counsel for the defendants that if the 
issues were to be tried without the defendants first 
specifying what they claimed under paragraph 6 of 
their answer as the deficiencies in performance by plain-
tiffs, the trial could be cumbersome and lengthy because 
it would then be the plaintiffs' burden to prove the per-
formance of the entire contract, most of which was 
already conceded to have been performed by the de-
fendants, and that the real issues must of necessity be 
then on only a few points. The court stated that in his 
opinion this would be an expeditious means of getting 
at the problem and he accordingly recommended, and 
the recommendation was accepted, that the defendants 
serve upon the plaintiffs a statement of what they clailn-
ed had not been performed by plaintiffs in the way of 
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work under the contract, a statement of what materials 
should have been furnished by plaintiff that had not 
been furnished and that plaintiffs should then review 
the same and see if an agreement on the matter could 
not be· reached. The defendants' statement was to be 
served on plaintiffs in ten days. Actually defendants 
did not serve plaintiff with any statement of any kind 
until Thursday, April 24th, preceding the trial on Mon-
day, April 28th. At that time, instead of the statement 
ordered by the Trial Court, plaintiffs were served with 
a counterclaim setting up not merely some item of 
materials claimed by defendants not to have been fur-
nished or labor not performed, but an entirely new 
theory of the case. Defendants, in their counterclaim, 
claimed damages for improper performance of the work 
required under the contract, and instead of a claim for 
some 1naterials under paragraph 6 of the contract, which 
it was claimed plaintiffs should have furnished and 
did not, a claim was made that plaintiffs had failed 
to furnish "cabinet work" as required under the defend-
ants' interpretation of the contract, a vastly different 
thing than some few materials which might have been 
required of plaintiffs under the contract. Plaintiffs were 
then charged for the first tim~ with not having con-
structed the swimming pool (R. 22-23). Instead of a 
set-off of some few dollars over which it appeared, at 
the pre-trial conference, there might be some difference 
between the parties, the defendants now asserted a 
counterclaim and set-off totalling $3,121.18, nearly twice 
the relief demanded in plaintiffs' original complaint. 
10 
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The Inorning of the trial plaintiffs 1noved to dtny 
defendants' 1notion to file the counterclailn as not having 
been tinwly n1ade. That the court 'vas taken completely 
by surprise by the action of the defendants at this late 
date was rlearly indicated by the court's comment at 
page 31 of the record where the court said, "I don't 
recall any mention of a counterclaim at the time of the 
pre-trial." And at page 32 where the court said, "What 
gets 1ne is, this action was filed in January, and now you 
come around with a counterclaim on the 22nd of April." 
The court then made inquiry as to the length of tin1e 
required to try the case, and asked counsel for plaintiffs 
if the counterclaim was filed if counsel for plaintiffs 
were prepared to try the issues on the counterclaim 
(R. 33). Plaintiffs stated that they were. The court 
thereupon perinitted the counterclaim· to be filed. There-
upon counsel for plaintiffs requested leave of court to 
file a Reply to join issues on the counterclaim and at 
this point 1fr. Hanson, counsel for defendants, said, "I 
have no objection, your Honor." (R. 33). 
Counsel for appellants thus led the trial court into 
the trap by taking the case completely outside the issues 
discussed at the pre-trial conference, waiving objection 
to the filing of the reply by plaintiffs, making no objec-
tion to the court's failure to enter a written pre-trial 
order. Now, after the trial of all the issues, the hearing 
of plaintiffs' witnesses and defendants' witnesses and 
the examination of all of the evidence introduced by the 
parties, because the trial court entered judgment for 
the plaintiffs, we now hear counsel for the defendants 
11 
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assert that the court's action constitutes error. Did 
the trial court err in permitting defendants to file their 
counterclaim setting up issues beyond those framed in 
the pre-trial, and did the court then err in permitting 
plaintiffs to file a reply countering these new issues and 
setting up an affirmative defense thereto when no objec-
tion was ever made by counsel for defendants to the 
filing of this reply~ Our answer is no ! The trial court 
did not err; and if it did, defendants cannot now com-
plain. Defendants made no objection to the filing of the 
reply to their counterclaim. Defendants made no objec-
tion to the fact that the pre-trial order was not reduced 
to writing. Can defendants now come and for the first 
time on appeal complain after the decision is rendered, 
of an act to which defendants consented at the trial? 
The law in this regard is clear-they cannot. 
American Jurisprudence makes a succinct statement 
of the law which is almost universally accepted with 
respect to this matter: 
"The general rule, subject to certain limita-
tions and exceptions hereinafter noted, is that 
an appellate court will consider only such ques-
tions as were raised and reserved in the lower 
court. This rule is based upon considerations of 
practical necessity in the orderly administration 
of the law and of fairness to the court and the 
opposite party, and upon principles underlying 
the doctrines of waiver and estoppeL Obviously 
the ends of justice are served by the avoidance 
of the delay and expense incident to appeals, 
reversals, and new trials upon grounds of objec-
tion which might have been obviated or corrected 
in the trial court if the que·stion had been raised. 
12 
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rrhere would be no assurance of any end to liti-
g·ation if new objections eould be raised on 
appeals. 'Yhere a party has the option to object 
or not, as he sees fit, the failure to exercise the 
option when the opportunity therefor presents 
itself n1ust, in fairness to the court and to the 
a<h-t'r~e party, be held either to constitute a 
waiYer of the right to object, or to raise an 
estoppel against the subsequent exercise thereof. 
*~ * *" 3 ~\m. Jur. P. :Z5, Sec. :2-lG. 
The doctrine announced above has been long ac-
cepted by this honorable court. 'V e call to the attention 
of the court the case of Idaho State Bank vs. Hooper 
Sugar Company, 7-l Utah 24, 276 P. 659. In that case 
the appellant on appeal attempted for the first time 
to raise a question of ambiguity in the complaint. It 
will be noted that the situation in that case and in the 
case before this court are indeed similar in that now 
counsel for appellants in the case at hand is trying to 
raise a claimed inconsistency between plaintiffs' com-
plaint and plaintiffs' reply and assign as error the trial 
court's action in permitting the reply to be filed. In 
the case above cited the Supreme Court said: 
"No question was raised in the trial court 
that the cmnplaint is uncertain or ambiguous in 
not alleging the kind of holde·r of the note plain-
tiff claimed to be. Such question is raised for 
the first time in the brief filed on behalf of 
Wright. In the absence of a timely attack upon 
the complaint in such respect, 'Vright should not 
be heard to complain about any ambiguity or 
uncertainty of the complaint for the first time 
in this court. * * *" Idaho State Bank vs. Hooper 
Suga.r Company, 7-l Utah 24, 276 P. 659 at page 
667. 
13 
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In the case of Flinders vs. Hunter, 60 Utah 314, 
208 P. 526, the court considered a similar problem: 
"No objection of any kind appears in the 
record that defendant's answer was not verified; 
nor was there any demurrer or objection inter-
posed to the answer. While it is true that our 
statute provides that if a complaint he verified 
other pleadings in the action must also be veri-
fied, yet it is also true that either party may waive 
strict compliance with the provisions of the 
statute. In case an answer is not verified when 
it should he the plaintiff may not go to trial 
and make the objection that the answer lacked 
verification for the first time in this court. By 
pursuing such a course he waives the defect and 
will not he heard to complain. Had he objected 
in the court below at the proper tli11e and in a 
proper manner, the defect could easily have been 
cured by n1aking a verification, and in default 
thereof the court could have stricken the answer. 
Plaintiff's assignment in that regard must there-
fore fail." 
We direct the court's attention to the fact that in 
the instant case, had counsel for appellants objected 
to. the filing of the reply, had counsel objected to the 
failure of the court to enter a written pre-trial order, 
the defect could have been easily and readily cured 
at that time. He surely should not he heard to complain 
for the first time in the Supreme Court. 
The attitude of this court toward failure to make 
obje-ction in the lower court and then raising the matter 
on appeal for the first time is so well expressed in 
Sandall vs. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093, that we 
14 
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quote briefly fron1 this opinion at the expense of being 
repetitious : 
••:\[any other error~ are assigned, but they 
are not referred to in appellants' brief; others 
are argued in the brief but were not assigned; 
others raise questions not presented in the court 
l1elozc; and finally, others allege insufficiency of 
the evidence to authorize a 1nodification of the 
decree without specifying the particulars where-
in the evidence is insufficient and without incor-
porating any of the evidence in the record. 
"'Such mnissions and commissions on the part 
of appellant are in disregard of the rules of prac-
tice of this court and have been condemned by 
the decisions of the court in every case with 
which we are familiar wherein the objection has 
been seasonably made and relied on. To cite all 
the cases so holding would require more space 
than ought to be accorded an entire opinion 
in an ordinary case. We cite a few, however, as 
a gentle rerninder (cases cited)." (Italics ours). 
Counsel for the appellants had ample opportunity 
to object to the introduction of the Reply by the respond-
ents. If he was taken by surprise, as he claims, by the 
issues therein framed he had the right to then and there 
call the matter to the attention of the trial court by q,n 
appropriate objection. This he did not do. In view 
of the citation from American Jurisprudence above 
stated and the doctrine announced in the Utah cases, 
we submit that with respect to Point III in appellants' 
brief there is nothing before this court for review. If 
counsel for appellants did not object to the filing of the 
counterclaim and the Reply thereto which framed new 
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issues completely outside the matters discussed in the 
pre-trial conference, then he certainly cannot be heard 
now to complain that the evidence on those issues so 
framed should not have been admitted as being outside 
the issues framed in the pre-trial conference. One is 
contemplated to intend the consequences of his own 
acts and counsel for appellants should not be permitted 
to assail the trial court for alleged failings which, if 
they exist at all, were of appellants' counsel's own mak-
ing. 
POINT II. 
A WRITTEN CONTRACT MAY BE REFORMED BY THE 
COURT TO EXPRESS THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE 
PARTIES WHEN THE CONTRACT AS WRITTEN CON-
TAINS A MISTAKE IN EXPRESSION \VHICH IS MUTUAL 
TO THE PARTIES. 
Point I of appellants' brief does not squarely raise 
the issue before this court. Appellant's assign as error 
in Point I of their brief the trial court's having permit-
ted plaintiffs to vary the terms of a written contract by 
parole evidence. This begs the question. The real ques-
tion before the court is did the trial court have the 
right and the power to reform a written instrument 
signed by the parties, in order to correct an error incor-
porated therein~ If it did have such power, then the 
violation of the parole evidence rule is not error. 
In the ease of Sine vs. Harper, Utah, 222 P. 2d 571, 
this court expressly recognized the power of the trial 
court in a proper case to undertake such a reformation, 
and stated that the resulting invasion of the parole 
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eYidence rule was a necessary incident to the exercise 
of that power. 
"Appellant is in error in her contention that 
testimony concerning the rnistake was inadmis-
sible because it varied the tenns of a written 
contract. If such a contention could be sustained 
then the equitable theory of refonnation of con-
tracts would not apply to written instruments. 
The right to reform is given, at least in part, 
so as to n1ake the written instrument exp1ess 
the bargain the parties previously orally agreed 
upon. \Yhen a writing is reformed the result is 
that an oral agreernent is by court decree made 
legally effectiYe although at variance with the 
writings which the parties had agreed upon as a 
memorial of their bargain. The principle itself 
modified the parol evidence rule." 
The court continues by citing with approval lhe 
following: 
"\Villiston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 5, 
Sec. 1552, states the rule as follows : 'The right 
of reformation wherever allowed is necessarily · 
an invasion or limitation of the parol evidence 
rule, since when equity reforms a writing it 
enforces an oral agreement at variance with the 
writing which the parties had agreed upon as a 
rnemorial of their bargain. This limitation is 
necessary to work justice, and there seems no 
more reason to object to it in case of reforma-
tion than in case of recission for fraud or for 
rnistake. In either case, unless the mistake pre-
cludes the existence of a contract at law, it should 
not be denied that the writing correctly states the 
actual contract or conveyance which has been 
made, but since it is inequitable to allow the 
enforcernent of it, and since justice requires sub-
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stitution of another in its place, equity gives 
relief where reformation is appropriate, and to 
that end necessarily admits any relevant parol 
evidence." Sime vs. Harper, supra. 
That the cou~ts of this state have inherent power 
to reform a written instrument is so well established 
that we need only cite a few of the decisions of this 
court to that effect. 
"Mutual mistakes can be corrected and courts 
will reform a contract so as to express what the 
parties actually agreed upon and make it express 
the terms upon which the minds of both parties 
met. The law on the subject is well established 
in this jurisdiction. If the same mistake be made 
by both parties, the contract may be rectified, but 
the proof must be clear and distinct, as the courts 
do not inake contracts for parties. To secure 
reformation of a written contract which is pre-
sumed to be the real contract and to contain all 
the terms agreed upon, the party seeking relief 
and demanding reformation of the contract must 
establish the mutual mistake by evidence that is 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing, and not mere-
ly by a preponderance of the evidence. Wherrit't 
v. Dennis, 48 Utah 309, 159 Pac. 534; Weight v. 
Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 14 7 P. 899 ; Deseret National 
Bank v. Dinwoodey et al., 17 Utah 43, 53 P. 
215; Ewing v. Keith, 16 Utah 312, 52 P. 4. 
The only question involved in this case is whether 
the proof produced by appellants, considered in 
connection with that offered by respondents, 
measures up to the required standard. The 
answer to this question necessitates a review of 
the testimony." Cram vs. Reynolds, et al., 55 
Utah 384, 186 P. 100. 
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Just as in the case ei ted above, the court in the 
instant ease is confronted with the necessity to review 
the testilnony. The law is clear, if the respondents' by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence established 
the mutual mistake in the written agreernent, then re-
spondents were entitled to have the court reform that 
agreenrent and to make the agreement conform to the 
actual agreernen t of the parties. Let us then examine 
the proof. 
Arnold Paulsen, the respondent who conducted the 
entire course of dealing on behalf of Paulsen Brothers 
Construction Co. with ~Ir. and ~Irs. Coombs, testified 
that he ·was asked by Mr. Coombs to bid upon the cost 
of carpenter labor in erecting a house according to. a 
set of plans, a copy of which plans were submitted to 
hiin by ~Ir. Coombs and which Mr. Paulsen identified 
from the stand as Exhibit "B." Mr. Paulsen further 
testified that this bid was not to include any materials, 
that it was to be only for the performance of the car-
penter labor required (R. 39, 40, 42). He testified that 
he did submit such a bid to Mr. Coombs and that he 
bid the sum of $5,500.00 for the performance of the 
carpenter labor required in the construction of the 
house, but was asked not to bid on the swimming pool 
(R. 53). In response to a question, Mr. Paulsen testified 
as follows: 
"A. It included all structural carpenter labor, 
and finished carpenter labor, both interior 
and exterior. 
"Q. Who was to furnish the material~ 
"A. Mr. Coombs. 
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"Q. Did he so state to you~ 
"A. Yes." (R. 39-40). 
Mr. Paulsen testified that Mr. Coombs accepted his 
verbal bid and ordered him to start work, which he did 
on about the 15th of October, 1950 (R. 46). In this 
regard Mr. Paulsen's testimony is clear and unequivocal. 
"Q. I refer again to the file, Exhibit A, and call 
your attention to the fact that this contract, 
which I believe you stated was the one you 
entered into, or which has been admitted 
by the defendants, is dated November 3, 1950 
-did you execute this contract after you 
commenced the job~ 
"A. Yes. We had done a little work on it before 
the contract was entered into. 
"Q. This work was started on the strength of 
this bid~ 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. And that bid did not contain any items of 
material~ 
''A. No." (R. 46). 
Mr. Paulsen further testified that he made a little 
memorandum of the bid on a slip of paper which he 
turned over to the architect for Mr. Coombs, one LeRoy 
W. Johnson (R. 41). Mr. Paulsen testified that sub-
sequent to the commencement of the work under the bid 
refeTred to above, he was called upon to sign the writ-
ten agreement, Exhibit "A," and his testimony in this 
regard is as follows: 
"Q. Did you, yourself, or anyone in your employ, 
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"A. 
"Q. 
''A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
"'A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
"'Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
prepare this typewritten agreement' (Refer-
ence is to exhibit "A"). 
No. 
Do you know who did prepare it' 
No, I don't. 
When did you first see the agreement Y 
In ~Ir. Coomb's office. 
At that time did you then execute the same 
with your signature' 
Yes. 
So that the date would be fixed November 3, 
1950, by the contract date; it that correct' 
That is correct. 
At that time did you and Mr. Coombs have 
any discussion with respect to supplying ma-
terials on the job Y 
No. 
Was there any change intimated to you by 
Mr. Coombs, with respect to your previous 
request when you made your bid' 
No, the·re wasn't. 
Did you, at the time, N ovembe·r 3, 1950, 
understand you were to furnish materials 
on the job' 
No. I had the understanding it was labor 
only." (R. 42). 
In contrast to the clear and unequivocal testimony 
of Mr. Paulsen on the submission of his bid for car-
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penter labor only, its acceptance by Mr. Coombs and the 
commencement of work on the basis of their verbal 
understanding, the court is requested to consider the 
testimony by Mr. Coombs at pages 132 through page 
136 of the record. Mr. Coombs evaded questions and 
even argued with counsel to the extent that it became 
necessary for the court to admonish Mr. Coombs to 
answer the questions and not to argue with counsel 
(R. 135). Mr. Coombs knew that he had not asked 
Arnold Paulsen to include any materials in his verbal 
bid. That the contract as ·written did not contain the 
true agreement of the parties is well shown, we believe, 
by the following exchange between counsel and ~fr. 
Coombs appearing at page 133 of the record; the specific 
examination was with regard to the material employed 
in the kitchen cabinets : 
"Q. I will also call your attention to the verbiage, 
~1r. Coombs and ask you if it says anything 
in there about ste·el cabinets, at any point? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Does it say any type of material~ 
"A. It says he will furnish cabinets in the kitchen. 
"Q. I have asked you, does it say any type of 
material at all~ 
"A. They can be~ 
"Q. Answer 'yes' or 'no.' 
"A. No. 
"Q. It doesn't does it~ 
"A. No. 
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"Q. Did yon eyer give a eopy of these specifica~ 
tions to .Mr. Paulsen~ 
.. A. Yes sir, I did. 
··Q. \Yhen did you do that~ 
··A. At the time we signed the contract. 
"Q. At the tin1e you signed the contract1 
··~~- Yes, sir. 
"Q. You didn't give them to him at the time you 
asked him to bid on the job did you 1 
"A. It is up to him when he makes a bid to get 
them himself. 
••Q. You did not furnish them to him 1 
.. A. I have them in the office. 
"Q. You didn't give them to him until after the 
contract was signed~ 
.. A. At the time the contract was signed, Arnold 
said the specifications didn't mean much, just 
turned them over. 
"Q. They don't, if you are not furnishing mate-
rial, do they~ 
"A. He should read his own contract, Mr. Tib-
bals. 
"Q. I am not arguing whether he should or 
shouldn't read the contract Mr. Coombs, I am 
asking whether he was ever requested to 
furnish material1 
"A. In his contract1 
"Q. Not until the contract was signed1 
"A. I went over the contract minutely. I said, 
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'Have you read this thing~' He said, 'Yes.' 
And signed it." (R. 133-134). 
When opposed to the clear cut testimony of Mr. 
Paulsen, it becomes apparent that this testimony of Mr. 
Coombs is the testimony of a man who is trying to e:vade 
an issue. The truth is, Mr. Coombs did not intend that 
the contract should cover materials. Let us see what 
he has to say as to the manner in which the material 
for the job was supplied. Mr. Coombs testified that 
he changed his plans as to materials used at will, ob-
tained bids from mills on various items· for the house, 
and all without one word of consultation with Arnold 
Paulsen or any other representative of the Paulsen 
Brothers (R. 123, 132). 
"Q. You felt perfectly free to get bids without 
conferring with Mr. Paulsen~ 
"A. That is true, I did get bids without con-
ferring with Mr. Paulsen. 
* * * * 
"Q. Did you at any time ask Mr. Paulsen if he 
was going to build the cabinets before you 
got the bids~ 
"A. I didn't want them in pine, discussed build-
ing them in pine, he was going to build them 
in pine, I wanted them built in birch, I wanted 
to get bids for birch. 
"Q. Do the plans specify the materials~ 
"A. The specifications do. He read them over. ·~ 
"Q. There is no showing ·Mr. Paulsen made his 
own-
"A. Just a minute-
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"THE COlTRT: Now, I think we will g·d 
along faster if the witness doesn't argue. 
"THE \YITNE~~: He is getting smart 
"~ith n1e. 
"THE COURT: Just answer the questions 
he asks. Don't argue. 
""Q. (By :.Mr. Tibbals) Now, 1lr. Coombs, what 
you did was to verbally go into a contract 
with :Jir. Paulsen, without specifications or 
anything else, except these plans, and you 
got him started on the job~ 
··A. Yes, he agreed to do that." (R. 135-136). 
\Y e submit that this course of conduct by Mr. Coontbs 
does not comport with his contention that Paulsen was 
to supply the materials under the contract. Further-
more, Coombs bought and paid for the materials himself 
and he so testified (R. 125). Mr. Coombs did not at any 
time prior to the commencement of this controversy, 
long after the job was completed, ever think for one 
minute that Paulsen was to supply material. His con-
duct is exactly that of a man who made a contract for 
labor and was to supply the material himself. 
Mr. Coombs further testified that he employed 
LeRoy Johnson, architect, as the supervisor to handle 
the job for him and paid him 2% of the contract price 
for his services (R.134). 
An architect employed to supervise is considered 
the agent of the owner by whom he is employed. 
"As a general rule, it may be said that as 
far as the preparation of plans is concerned, an 
architect aets as an independent contractor, but 
that so far as regards the performance of his 
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supervisory function .with respect to a building 
under construction he ordinarily acts as the agent 
and representative of the person for whom the 
work is being done." 3 Am. Jur., Architects, P. 
1000, Sec. 5. 
Mr. Johnson's testimony on the preparation of the 
contract and upon the understanding had between Paul-
sen and Coombs is most enlightening, and it should be 
borne in mind that Mr. Johnson was the agent of Mr. 
Coombs. Mr. Johnson testified as .follows: 
"Q. Mr. Johnson, with respect to the contract 
which I .just showed to you, do you know 
where that was prepared, to your own knowl-
edge~ [Reference was to exhi·bit "A"]. 
"A. The carpenter, the sub-contractor, Mr. Paul-
sen, brought a roughly drafted contractual 
agreement to my office, and requested that it 
be typed up for signature by himself and 
Mr. Coombs. 
"Q. Was this typed then in your office~ 
"A. It was. 
"Q. By whom~ 
"A. It was typed by the stenographer. 
"Q. · I call your attention specifically, Mr. John-
son, to Paragraph 6 of that contract, will 
you read that, please~ 
"A. Uh, huh. (Examines contract). All right. 
"Q. Now, with respect to that paragraph, Mr. 
Johnson, do you know of your own knowledge 
whether the bid which you referred to, that 
was brought in in rough draft contained the 
language which appears in P~ragraph 6 ~ 
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"A. It did not contain the language as appears 
in Paragraph 6. 
··MR. HANSON: Just a nwn1ent, your 
Honor. \Y e will object to that and move to strike 
it, on the ground you cannot vary the terms of 
a eontraet by parol evidence. 
"THE COURT: The objection is overruled . 
.. MR. TIBBALS: You may answer the 
question, 1\lr. Johnson .. 
"A. It was not the form of the contract, and the 
document by 1\tfr. Paulsen was not worded in 
this manner. 
''Q. Do you know of your own knowledge where 
the verbiage-and I refer specifically to the 
item: 
•• "l\Iillwork under this contract specifically 
includes and covers the furnishing and installa-
tion of the following cabinet work, all cabinet 
work shown on plans in the following roonts: 
Planting box in dining room, cabinets in kitchen 
and day room, storage cabinets above laundry 
equipment in utility room, shelving and hook 
strips in all wardrobe closets in bedrooms, shelv-
ing for linen cabinets, bookcases in den, lava-
tory counters in bath and shower rooms ready 
for tile, counter tops by others. Five sets of 
fruit storage shelves in storage room. Shelving 
in broom closet off the day room. The above 
named items of millwork are to be mill built or 
equal as acceptable to the archi·tect, and all labor 
and materials for these items and their instal-
lation are to be furnished by this contractor 
according to the terms of this agreement.' 
"Do you know where that verbiage origin-
ated' 
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"A. Very likely by virtue of the fact that the 
stenographer in practice was used to typing 
all specifications and contracts from the ref-
erence to labor and materials as a tied-to-
gether phrase, as a common phrase. 
"Q. Is that a phrase which appears in your gen-
erally accepted Architect Institute forms~ 
"A. It appears in the standard forms of the 
specifications, the general condition as pre-
pared in the American Institute of Architects. 
"Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whe-
ther Mr. Paulsen was asked to bid on mate-
rials for this job~ 
"A. No. 
"Q. You do not know~ 
"A. I will rephrase it. I know he was not asked 
to bid on materials. 
"Q. You know he was not asked to bid on mate-
rials~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Do you know of your own knowledge, whe-
ther Mr. Paulsen furnished materials for this 
contract~ 
"A. No, Mr. Paulsen did not furnish materials." 
(R. 69-71). 
We submit to this honorable court that the respond-
ents sustained in the court below the burden impos~d 
upon them in asking for reformation of the contract 
to exclude the word "materials" from paragraph 6 there-
of. The respondents proved by absolutely clear and 
uncontroverted evidence that they made a bid for doing 
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carpenter labor only and that this bid wa~ in the amount 
of $5,500.00. lt was ad1nitted that work wa~ ordered 
conunenced, and did actually com1nence, on the strength 
of this bid, thereby constituting an acceptance of the 
bid by ~Ir. Comnbs and forn1ing a binding agreement 
between the parties. We have shown that the word "ma-
terials" was inserted in the written agreement, which 
was signed by the parties some three weeks after the 
work commenced, by a scrivener in the employ of the 
architect. 'y e have shown that the conduct of the parties 
confirmed the fact that the understanding was that Paul-
sen Brothers Construction Co. would perform the car-
penter labor and Coombs would furnish the materials. 
As further evidence of the fact that respondents car-
ried this burden succ~ssfully in the lower court, we sub-
mit that the lower court, the trier of the fact, who heard 
the testimony of the witnesses, who examined the evi-
dence, found that the respondents were entitled to a 
reformation of the contract to exclude the word "mate-
rials" therefrom. We believe the lower court should be 
sustained in this finding. 
Some effort is made by appellants to indicate that 
the pleading by the respondents in the court below was 
not sufficient to place the issue of reformation before the 
court for consideration. We submit that under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs reply filed in the 
court below adequately states the grounds for reforma-
tion of the contract on the basis of mutual mistake. The 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule "8" provides: 
"A pleading which ~ets forth a claim for 
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relief, whether an or.iginal claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim or third party claim, shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim, 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and 
(2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which 
he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alter-
native or of several different types may be de-
manded." 
It is submitted that respondents met this requirement. 
Appellants in their brief confuse the matter of 
reformation of the contract with respect to the matter 
of the "materials" and the question of whether or not 
the swimming pool was ever included in the contract. 
Mr. Paulsen stated he did not bid on the swimming pool 
(R. 60). The contract written or oral never made any 
mention of the swimming pool (R. 6 and 7). The arch-
itect testified tha:t Mr. Paulsen was not asked to bid on 
the swimming pool, that the swimming pool was not 
going to be built at tha:t time by Mr. Coombs (R. 72, 78). 
Only Mr. Coombs ever testified to the contrary and when 
asked in regard to the matter he te-stified that the swim-
ming pool was in the plans but he netrer at any time 
testified that Mr. Paulsen was asked to bid thereon (R. 
115). Only by a gross stretch of the word "residence" 
to make it include a swimming pool could it be said that 
Paulsen ever bid on a swimming pool for Mr. Coombs. 
Mr. Johnson, the architect, ·testified that the swimming 
pool was a separate item from the residence and that 
estimates and bids would be separately itemized (R. 81). 
Mr. Johnson, architeet and agent for the owner Mr. 
Coombs, further testified that there was not anything 
so 
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m connection with ~lr. Paulsen's bid or the contract 
which was ultunately signed that would indicate con-
struction of a swinnning pool was included as a part 
thereof ~R. 88). 
The fact is that as has been stated the swiimning 
pool was siinply never included in the contract. The 
burden of proof lay on the appellants in the lower court 
to show that the swimming pool was included in the 
contract, and this was an issue of fact, not of law. The 
evidence, until the testiinony of Coombs, was so clear 
that Paulsen had not been asked to bid on the swimming 
pool and that it was not included in the contract, that 
the appellants' attorney withdrew his questions with 
regard to it (R. 106). Not until Mr. Coombs testified 
:. did there come any issue with respect to the swimming 
pool. Again, . the trial court, trier of the fact and sole 
and exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses, 
after having heard the testimony and examined the evi-
dence, found in favor of the respondents on this issue 
by finding that the work included in the contract was 
._: __ -_ 
...... ~· 
.' ... ·· 
completed without the swiinming pool. 
Appellants further confuse the issue by trying to 
make it appear that respondents are seeking to reform 
the contract with respect to certain o;ther items consist-
ing of a redwood fence and certain partitions in a bath 
house which was to be part of the garage. It was testi-
fied the redwood fence was never built and neither were 
the partitions in the bath house (R. 80). The appellants 
claim a credit for the amount which was included in the 
original bid of Mr. Paulsen to cover these items which 
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were not built. Mr .. Paulsen testified that Mr. Coombs 
had been given credit for these items as offset against 
certain additional work done by Paulsen for which no 
charge was ever made to Coombs (R. 44). That this 
offset was approved as fair and equitable is testified 
to by the fact that Mr. Johnson, architect and agent for 
Coombs, stated the job was completed with the exception 
of an item of finish hardware whieh Coombs had never 
furnished to be installed (R. 73, 74). The testimony 
in this regard is not only clear, it is uncontroverted. .. 
Since no reformation of the contract is either sought 
by respondents, or necessary, in regard to these items, 
the respondents are not . held to the rule of evidence 
which the appellants seek to apply to respondents in 
their brief in discussing this matter. In the absence of 
some showing of a complete failure of the evidence to 
comport with the Findings of the Court, the appellate 
court will nnt interfere with the Findings· made by the 
Trial Court. 
"When dealing with findings of fact made hy 
the trial court, the question for the appellate court 
is whether there was any evidence to sustain the 
conclusion reached by the court below. A finding 
of fact by the court below canno·t be rejected on 
appeal where there was sufficient evidence to 
sustain it, where it is not contrary to the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, where it cannot be 
said there was no warrant for the finding, or 
where there is room for reasonable minds to 
differ as to the facts. As the rule is laid down 
by many courts, findings of the trial court which 
are supported or sustained by competent evidence 
are binding upon the appellate court and cannot 
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or will not be interfered with or di~ttubed by 
-that eourt even though the evidence is conflict-
ing. The evidence 1nu~t he elparly against the 
finding~ in order to ju~tify a n•versal." 3 Aineri-
can Juri~prudence-Appeal and Error-Sec. 900, 
P. 464-6. 
Also see Angerman Co. v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 
290 P. 169, wherein this court held that if a finding of 
the trial court is based upon sufficient evidence, this 
court is powerless to interfere with it even if it were 
disposed to do so. 
Though the reformation of the contract is a matter 
lying within equity, the other Inatters urged by the 
appellants ·which are outside of the scope of the problem 
of reformation should not be permitted to serve as a 
basis for setting aside the findings of fact in the lower 
court on a matter which otherwise would only be review-
able on the law. An action to recover the contract price 
is normally considered to be an action at law. There-
fore, simply because the equity jurisdiction of the court 
is invoked to reform the contract on the matter of the 
inclusion of the word "materials" in paragraph 6 of the 
contract, does not bring the matter of the remaining 
items requiring an interpretation at law of the contract 
before this court in such a manner that this court has 
jurisdiction to review the facts as found by the Trial 
Court on· those matters not relating to the problem in 
equity. The Utah Code provides at Title 20-2-2, U.C.A. 
1943, 
"* * * In equity cases the appeal may be on 
questions of both law and fact; in cases at law 
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the appeal shall be on questions of law alone." 
No attempt is made by appellants to set forth ques-
tions on appeal on any issues at law under the contract, 
and appellants should not be permitted by this court 
to so enlarge the matter of reformation of the contract 
as to subject the decision of the lower court to review 
by this court on issues of fact not relating to the refor~ 
mation of the contract. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED THE 
CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS AS AN EXHIBIT. 
Appellants urge that the lower court should have 
admitted the construction specifications as an exhibit 
and that the exclusion of these specifications was an 
error. Mr. Pauls~n testified that he never did see the 
construction specifications (R. 50). Mr. Coombs himself 
admitted he did not give Mr. Paulsen the specifications 
until the contract was signed and that he did not give 
them to him at the time that he solicited Mr. Paulsen 
to bid on the carpenter labor (R. 133). The architect, 
l\1r. Johnson, testified that he never gave a set of the 
specifications to Mr. Paulsen (R. 72). In view of these 
facts which were never controverted, the specifications 
could hardly have been considered as material or rele-
vant to determination of the issues in this case and were 
correctly excluded. 
POINT IV. 
A PARTY TO A CONTRACT CANNOT AT ONE AND 
THE SAME TIME CLAIM THE PROTECTION OF THE CON-
TRACT AND THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE SAME IN-
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SOFAR AS IT BENEFITS Hil\I AND CHOOSES TO IGNORE 
THE CONTRACT INSOFAR AS IT LIMl 'rS HIM, OR BINDS 
HIM. 
Appellants seek to compel the respondents to live 
up to the terms of Exhibit "A," but hold then1selves as in 
no way bound by its provisions. The ridiculousness of 
the position assumed by appellants becomes apparent 
in considering just one item under the contract. It is 
appellants' position that Paulsen Brothers were required 
to furnish carpenter labor and materials under the item 
6 of the exhibit referred to above. Having entered into 
a contract whereby Paulsens were to do this work, then 
can ~Ir. Coombs ignore the contract and purchase the 
items to be built and furnished by Paulsen Brothers 
from others and incur no penalty under the contract~ 
If so, then there is a failure of consideration under 
the contract and the contract is void. Let us consider 
the steel kitchen cabinets which :Mr. Coombs testified 
he had at all times contemplated under the contract 
(R. 132). :Mr. Coombs would have us believe that when 
Paulsen had contracted to build the kitchen cabinets to 
a standard of "mill built or equivalent" that neverthe-
less he, Mr. Coombs, could purchase steel cabinets with-
out even conferring with Paulsen and then simply deduct 
the cost of the steel cabinets from the amount of Mr. 
Paulsen's contract. To carry this to its ridiculous ex-
treme. Suppose Mr. Coombs had decided to have the 
kitchen cabinets made of platinum, would. he have then 
been entitled to charge Mr. Paulsen $10,090.00 for the 
cost thereof, because Mr. Paulsen had agreed to furnish 
kitchen cabinets mill built or equivalent~ Mr. Coombs 
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is bound as much by the agreement as Mr. Paulsen. 
Mr. Paulsen agreed to furnish the labor to provide kit-
chen cabinets mill built or equivalent, if Mr. Coombs 
chose after entering into the contract to go elsewhere 
and purchase cabinets of another sort he will never-
theless have to pay Mr. Paulsen the contract price, 
and with no deduction. One party to a contract cannot 
at will change the contract without there being a meeting 
of the minds and a new consideration to support the 
new contract. American Juris prudence has this to tsay 
on the questions of mutuality: 
"In many judicial decisions there may be 
found language to the effect that in order that 
a contract may be enforceable there must be 
mutuality. It has even been said that a contract 
implies mutual obligations. If by mutuality of 
obligation is 1neant, as some courts have sug-
gested, that there must be an undertaking on one 
side and a consideration on the other, the neces-
sity for its existence cannot be questioned. But 
if, as other courts have said, mutuality of obli-
gation means that a contract 1nust be binding 
on both parties, so that an action can be main-
tained by each against the other, the statement 
that mutuality of obligation is essential to every 
contract is too broad. vVhatever the rule may be 
with respect to the specific enforcement of con-
tracts, there can be no doubt that if a contract 
is ever unenforceable in other wavs because of 
the lack of mutuality, it is becaus~ such lack of 
mutuality creates a want of 1 consideration. * * • 
Consideration is essential; mutuality of obliga-
tion is not unless the want of n1utuality would 
leave one party without a valid or available 
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: 
eon~ideration for his promi~e. The doctrine of 
n1utuality of obligation thPrPfore appears to be 
merely another n10de of ~ta ting- the rule of con-
sideration that where therp i~ no other considera-
tion for a contract, the m:t!uul ]Jromises must be 
binding on both partie·.·, for the reason that only 
a binding promise is sufficient consideration for a 
pr01nise of the other party." 1:2 A1n. J ur. "Con-
tracts," p. 509-11-8ec. 13. (Italics ours). 
In the instant case we believe that this contract was 
as binding upon :Jlr. Combs as upon Paulsen Brothers, 
and that he could not, after having accepted their bid 
for the carpenter labor, then single handedly and wi1:h-
out consultation, as he admitted from the stand he did 
(R. 135), solicit other bids for the supplying of work 
which Paulsen Brothers contracted to supply, make 
purchases on the strength of these new bids, and then 
expect Paulsen Brothers to give him credit against the 
original contract for the purchases so made. 
"However, no abrogation, change, modifica-
tion, or substitution in a primary contract can 
be effected by the sole action of one of the parties 
to it. The consent of both is required to cancel, 
alter, or supplant a contract fairly made. The 
same n1eeting of the minds is needed that was 
necessary to make the contract in the first place." 
12 Am. J ur. "Contract:-:," p. 983, Sec. 405. 
We therefore submit, that the items for which Mr. 
Coombs claims credit under the contract would, if allow-
ed, constitute the modification and alteration of the con-
tract in violation of the law .of contract, and specifically 
we refer to the cost of the steel kitchen cabinets, the cost 
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of the birch planter box, the cabinets for the stud). 
If the court were to permit this alteration of the con-
tract by Mr. Coombs without even so much as consulta-
tion with Mr. Paulsen, it would indeed result in a situa-
tion, to quote from the conclusion of the appellants' 
brief, where "The sanctity of the written agreement, 
which heretofore has only been modified upon the clear-
est and most convincing kind of proof, would disappear 
and the advantage be given to those who seek to avoid 
their solemn obligations." Mr. Coombs never at any time 
showed any waiver by Paulsen of his right to be paid 
for the items to be furnished under the contract. Mr. 
Paulsen is in all events entitled to receive payment for 
his labor which he contracted to furnish. If Coombs did 
not use the labor he contracted for, that is his loss, not 
Paulsen Brothers', and he should not be permitted by 
this court to shift the loss to Paulsen Brothers. 
POINT V. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT. 
Appellants have not either in the lower court, or 
upon this appeal, ever been willing to recognize the plain-
tiffs' theory of this case or to deal with it in the form 
presented by the plaintiffs. Their policy has been 
throughout the case to work on their own sep~rate 
theory of the case and not to respond to the theory 
advanced by the plaintiffs. So it is, in the appellants' 
discussion of the evidence under their Point IV "The 
. ' 
. Judgment Is Contrary To The Evidence," as set forth 
in their brief. 
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Plaintiff::; and respondents have advaneed only one 
theory of this case from the beginning. Namely that 
Paulsen Brothers Construction Cmnpany entered into a 
contract to furnish carpenter labor in the construction 
of a residence for Coon1bs. That this contract was form-
ed on the basis of a verbal understanding. That in re-
ducing the verbal understanding to writing an error 
occurred which neither of the parties observed, namely 
that in paragraph 6 of the agreement the word "mate-
rials" was included when it should not have been. That 
subject to this one necessary reformation the contract 
has been performed as agreed upon. That certain sub-
stitutions were made with the approval of the architect, 
namely the ceiling was firred down in the living room, 
dining room and hallway to accommodate a change made 
after the bid was entered in the heating plans (R. 44), 
and put in some panelling in the west end of the bed-
rooms which was not called for when the bid was su~ 
mitted. That no charge was made for the extra work 
thus entailed but it was used, with the architect's ap-
proval, as an offset to the cost of the labor in installing 
the shower partitions and the redwood fence which were 
not built though included in the original bid and the 
plans (R. 44). The architect testified the job was com-
pleted except for one item of finish hardware the esti-
mated cost of installation of which was around $10.00 
:--,, (R. 69, 73, 74). It was testified that the Paulsen Broth-
--- ers had at all- times stood ready to install this hardware 
.- but that it had never been furnished by Coombs, and 
that Mr. Paulsen had gone on several occasions to install 
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the same but that the hardware was not available (R. 61, 
62). It is recognized in the law of contract that one party 
to the contract cannot by his own failure, which thereby 
prevents the other party's performance, avoid liability 
under the contract because of the failure to perform 
resulting from his own fault. 
"It is sometimes said that an offer to per-
forn1 is equivalent to performance or that an 
offer to perform or do an act which is prevented 
by the party in whose favor performance is to be 
made, is equivalent to performance." 12 Am. Jur. 
"Contracts," Sec. 335, P. 892. 
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that even 
the architect's estimate of the portion of the contract 
not performed was only $10.00. Certainly, therefore, 
the proof is conclusive that the contract was performed 
by Paulsen Brothers. It was admitted by the defendants 
that payment of the final payment due to Paulsen Broth-
ers under the contract in the sum of $1,375.00 had not 
been made, and that payment for the extras in the 
amount of $185.00 had not been made, though the extras 
were admitted to have been performed (R. 30). We sub-
mit that a review of the entire record does not reflect 
one scintilla of evidence to the contrary. 
The defendants, however, refuse to recognize or 
deal with this theory of the case whatever and refuse 
to recognize the situation as it exists. Defendants try to 
show a state of facts that never did exist and which was 
never contemplated by the parties. The defendants take 
the matter of the redwood fence and the matter of the 
shower partitions and simply brush aside the fact that 
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J"...-
the substitution of the work needed in the eon~truction 
of these itents was elsewhere applied with the approval 
of the arehitect who \Yas the agent of Comnbs. 'L'hey <say 
that these items were not built and therefore l\lr. Coombs 
should have credit for them. By so doing, they disavow 
the approval of the architect to the substitution made. 
If then they so do, they n1ust pay for the extra labor 
performed in the items substituted. The picture is as 
broad as it is long. ~Ir. Coombs is not entitled to be 
unjustly enriched by disavowing the act of the architect 
in permitting the substitution of the one labor for the 
other, and then refusing to pay for either the labor called 
for or the labor substituted. 
The matter of the swimming pool has been elsewhere 
treated at length. Suffice it to say that the testimony 
was conclusive that l\Ir. Paulsen never bid on the swim-
ming pool. That he never contracted to do any work 
on the swimming pool. This was testified to by Mr. 
Paulsen, and :Jir. Johnson, the architect (R. 53, 60, 78). 
Mr. Coombs evaded the question by saying the swimming 
pool was in the plans, but he never did say that Paulsen 
submitted a bid or agreed to build the swimming pool 
(R. 89). The written contract makes no mention of the 
swimming pool (R. 6 and 7). One of the theories by 
which the defendants seek to have an offset made against 
respondents for the amount of the cost of the swimming 
~: 
..... pool carpentry is so novel as to merit passing reference. 
~·"" At page 22 of their brief they refer to a conversation 
rl!J between Coombs and the archi teet Mr. Johnson, wherein 
l\1r. Johnson said that Coombs ·would save between 
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$350.00 and $400.00 by not building the . swiJnming pool, 
that this was the value of the carpenter labor. Mr. 
Paulsen was not a party to the conversation, had nothing 
to do with it, yet defendants and appellants seek to bind 
responp.ents to the architect's estimate of a saving which 
would be made by not· building the swimming pool, and 
to deduct this from a contract which did not in the first 
instance include any amount for the labor involved in 
constructing the swimming pool. 
A great show is made by appellants in their brief 
of the supposed concessions made by the respondents' 
counsel as to the value of the labor and materials on cer-
tain items. Counsel for appellants completely ignore 
the statement of counsel for respondents setting forth 
the condition upon which the concession was made, 
namely that the court not hold with the respondents 
on their interpretation of the contract (R. 33). The 
fact is that the court did hold with respondents on the 
interpretation of the contract. Further, the appellants 
did not. at any time ever accept or agree to be bound 
by the figures set forth by the counsel for respondents. 
On the contrary appellants insisted upon an interpreta-
tion of the contract which has heretofore been discussed 
at great length in this brief, an interpretation which the 
lower court found untenable. 
The issue raised by the appellants on the quailty 
of the workmanship is such an . obviously desperate 
attempt to find some means by which to avoid the pay-
ment of the sum justly due to Paulsen Brothers that 
it is doubtful whether it should be dignified by an attempt 
to reply to it. 
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The ti.r~t allegation hy appellants of a basis of a 
claim for danmges is that Paulsen Brothers incorrectly 
installed the windows. The supervising architect admit-
ted there was nothing wrong with the way the windows 
were installed, that he himself had been on the job after 
the windo,vs were in place but before it became impos-
sible to change then1 without n1ajor reconstruction, but 
that he never noticed anything wrong, and that the 
change desired by Coombs was for aesthetic reasons 
having nothing to do with the function ~f the windows 
(R. 88). 
The second item on which damage is claimed is with 
respect to a steel sliding door. The only thing Paulsen 
Brothers were required to do by the contract with 
Coombs in respect to this door was to frame the opening. 
This was done in accordance with the architect's in-
structions, and he so testified. The door did not operat~ 
properly because of a failure in the equipment sup-
plied with the door, and this equipment had to he 
changed, but the failure had not one thing to do with 
Paulsen or the contract which he had with Coombs 
.-: (R. 89). 
The third item is a matter of. the hardwood floors. 
The testinwny in this regard by the supposed expert 
who appeared for the defendants was nothing short of 
/ pitiful. He admitted he was never on the job during 
. . construction, that he never examined how the floors 
were nailed, that the material was an inferior grade, 
J'il that he never examined the subflooring, but that the 
~1 floors were loose and that this was of necessity the fault 
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of Paulsen Brothers Construction Company because 
the floors were not nailed properly-and this when he 
admitted he didn't know how they were nailed (R. 100, 
101). The evasive shifty testimony of this witness is 
what the court was asked to consider as overcoming 
the testimony of the architect and of Mr. Paulsen that 
the floors were correctly laid (R. 89, 90, 140). 
CONCLUSION 
This case can be characterized in brief as the classic 
situation of wanting the best, but not wanting to pay for 
the best. Mr. Coombs planned to build this large home, 
with a swi~ming pool, and all of the elegance that goes 
with it, but he didn't want to pay for it when the hills 
came in. In a frantic attempt to avoid paying the debt 
due to Paulsen Brothers, Mr. Coombs first took advan-
tage of an error which he discovered in the contract that 
he had signed with Mr. Arnold Paulsen, an error of 
which neither of the parties were aware at the ·time of 
signing the contract, namely that the scrivener had 
mistakenly included "materials" in clause 6 of the con-
tract where it was never to have been included. Appar-
ently feeling himself insecure on this ground of avoiding 
the obligation, he· later added another possible means of 
evasion. As late as the pre-trial conference he had not 
thought up a counterclaim for damages as a means of 
counteracting his justly incurred liability to Paulsen 
Brothers, but when he did think of it, his counsel 
changed the ·entire theory of the case and filed a counter-
claim 'for damages. The only difficulty has been, that 
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~Ir. Co01nbs could not sustain the burden of proof on his 
counterclalin, and the plaintiffs could and did sustain 
the burden of proof on their complaint and reply. The 
trial court recognized this fact after having heard the 
testin1ony of all the witnesses and examining all the 
evidence and accordingly awarded judgment to the plain-
tiffs. 
The debt owed by the Coombs to Paulsen Brothers 
is an honest debt, fairly contracted. The Coombs have 
received full value for every dollar due on the debt. 
The debt should have been paid long ago. The decision 
of the lower court is sound and just, and we urge that 
this court recognize that fact and lend its power and 
strength in support of the cause of right and justice 
by sustaining the decision of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
by ALLEN H. TIBBALS 
EARL P. STATEN 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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